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Realizing the Re-Emergence of the
Chinese Stock Market: Fact or
Fiction?
ABSTRACT

The stock market which currently exists in the People's
Republic of China (PRC) is a product of the "opendoor policy"
introduced by Deng Xiaoping in 1978, following the death of
Mao Zedong, to promote economic development over class
struggle.
Following limited experimentation with stock
issuance at the local level, the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock
exchanges opened in 1990 and 1991 respectively. Since its
recent inception, China's stock market-which comprises the
trading of domestically owned A-Shares and foreign-owned
B-Shares-has experienced impressive growth together with
periods of volatility as well as lacklusterperformance. Recent
performance of A-Share trading has been strong, while BShare trading has been riddled with problems due to the lack
of enforcement of the "foreign ownership only" rule. In
Februaryof 1997, the death of DengXiaoping, the architectof
China'scurrent socialistmarket economy, surprisinglydid not
cause any significantdownturn in the stock market
This Note first offers a brief history of the recent reemergence of the stock market in China, which has thrived
several other times in China's long history. Second, the
author questions the Chinese market's future viability as an
internationallycompetitive stock market. In determining what
the future holds for China's stock market, the author first
examines the PRC's commitment to resolving the ideological
"counter-socialistdilemma" presented by the introduction of
capitalist reforms into China's socialist economy. Although
Chinese leaders disagree as to how to resolve the countersocialistdilemma, they are committed to resolving it The Note
suggests that in order to truly realize the re-emergence of its
stock market, the PRC must enact and enforce a national
securities law and repeal its policy of censoring all foreign
news and financial information entering the country. Until
such steps are taken, the author concludes that China's stock
market will remain an inefficient and highly risky emerging
market.
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I. INTRODUCTION

The People's Republic of China (PRC) is positioned to make
significant future economic strides, including the re-emergence of
an internationally recognized stock market, based on its
impressive track record over the past decade. However, the
actual realization of the stock market's re-emergence may be a
product of fiction, unless Chinese leaders resolve the inherent
conflict between state ownership and efficient markets for
privately-owned stock.
Section II gives a brief history of the recent development of
the Chinese securities market. China entered the 1980s with a
desperate need for capital to support the growth of its then
anemic centrally planned industrial and agricultural economy.
Following state-controlled experimentation with stock issuance
and trading in the late 1980s, the Chinese stock market "reemerged," after more than forty years in dormancy, in the early
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1990s, when two stock markets sprang to life in Shanghai and

Shenzhen. I

As a result, individuals currently may purchase

publicly-traded shares of joint-stock companies. 2 Despite the
impressive development of the stock market since 1990,3 the

nascent Chinese stock market has not truly re-emerged due to
the limited number of publicly traded shares.

1.
The stock exchange in Shanghai was closed in 1949 upon the founding
of the PRC by the Communists under the leadership of Mao Zedong. Tan Lay
Hong, Capitalism in the People's Republic of China?: A Survey of the Re-Emerging
Securities and FinancialMarkets, 16 COMPANY LAW. 72, 72 (1995). Domestic stock
exchanges also existed briefly in Beijing and Tianjin from 1949 until 1952. Id.
2.
Individual shares represent only 25% of the total corporate shares held
in China, with the government owning the remaining 75%. K. Matthew Wong.
Note. Securities Regulations in China and Their Corporate Finance Implications on
State Enterprise Reform. 65 FORDHAM L. REv. 1221. 1238 (1996). In addition,
individuals may not possess over 0.5% of common stocks issued by a listed
company. Interim Regulations on the Issue and Trading of Shares. State Council
(issued and effective April 22, 1993), art. 46, translated in Chinese Stock Trading
Regulations, BBC SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS, at C1 Special Supp.. May 20,
1993, available in LEXIS, News Library. Bbcswb File [hereinafter 1993 Interim
Regulations].
3.
In 1995, Professor Xiao Zhuoji. a Chinese economist, articulated the
following ten "breakthroughs" that the Chinese securities market had experienced
since 1990:
[(1)1 The traditional ownership structure has been upgraded. New models
with public ownership as the bulk. coexisted with other sectors, have been

developed from social development to the organization of business.
[(2)] The socialization of capital ownership, in which the public can own
the capital of one or several enterprises by buying stocks.
[(3)] The stock market has changed the traditional distribution system in
that stock holders are allowed to get income other than their work.
[(4)] Issuing of stocks and bonds has changed the traditional means of
raising funds such as bank loans and financial allocation by the
government.
[(5)1 Residents have more ways to store their financial assets, ways others
than owning deposits and cash.
[(6)] Through issuing B shares reserved for overseas investors and listing
companies in Hong Kong, the United States and Singapore. China has
widened channels to raise foreign funds in a simpler and more efficient
way.
[(7)] The traditional methods of managing financial assets have been
modernized. The public turns deposits and cash into various securities so
as to get higher profits on the basis of safety and mobility.
[(8)] Stock market, instead of government assessment, has become an
important method In rating enterprises.
[(9)] Stock trading has promoted the re-organization of capital structure,
making it possible to produce better returns.
[(10)] The stock market has changed people's attitude towards such
concepts as capital, profit, bonus, risk, speculation and investment.
Economist on Breakthroughs of China'sStock Market, Nov. 27, 1995, Xinhua News
Agency, available in 1995 WL 7716434.
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Section III examines the PRC's long-term commitment to
resolving the ideological "counter-socialist dilemma" presented by
capitalist reform and to developing an independent and
While China has
internationally competitive stock market.
already made impressive strides in developing its socialist market
economy, conservative Communist leaders have signaled their
reservations about the pace of capitalist-laden reforms.
Consequently, the PRC has enacted various regulations that
effectively cabin the capitalist experimentation by limiting
Chinese enterprises' access to the emerging stock market,
restricting the flow of information to the stock market, and
maintaining a high level of state ownership in publicly-traded
stock companies. However, despite the ideological quagmire
confronting Chinese leaders, evidence shows that they are
committed to resolving the "counter-socialist dilemma," some
more conservatively than others, in order to move China forward
in the global marketplace. It is now a question of how to resolve
this dilemma, rather than whether to resolve it.
are
not
ideological barriers
Assuming that the
insurmountable and that Deng Xiaoping's successors will
continue to implement economic reforms, China should take
certain fundamental steps in the near future to realize the true
re-emergence of its stock market in the twenty-first century.
Section IV shows that in order to enable the Chinese stock
market to attract the abundant personal savings of Chinese
nationals. 4 as well as foreign investors, China must stabilize and
improve the efficiency of its stock market through the

enforcement of a comprehensive national securities law and the
repeal of its censorship policy.
II.

CAPITALISM IN CHINA? THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CHINESE STOCK

MARKET

A. FromMao to Markets
China has supported a stock market during several recent
periods 5 in its long history, 6 but none has ever grown into an

4.

China's household savings rate Is among the world's highest at about

40% of disposable income. MEI XIA ET AL., THE RE-EMERGING SECURITIES MARKEr IN

CHINA xii (1992).
5.
Stock markets existed In China from the late 19th century until the
1920s, from the 1930s until 1949, and from 1949 until 1952. Andrew Xuefeng
Qian, Riding Two Horses: Corporatizing Enterprises and the Emerging Securities
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"independent institution"7 strong enough to survive China's
political turmoil. For instance, during the 1940s, the Shanghai
Securities Exchange was the largest stock market in Asia and
more influential and internationally supported than that of Hong
Kong, 8 but the 1949 Communist takeover 9 caused its abrupt
demise. Under the rule of Mao Zedong, the Communist Party
believed that capitalist stock markets contributed to corruption,
bureaucracy, and smuggling. 10 Once again, political forces in
China effectively wiped out the securities market.'1
Although Chairman Mao and his supporters had used tightly
centralized control with some degree of success in restoring

Regulatory Regime in China. 12 UCLA PAc. BASIN L.J. 62, 64 & nn.6-8 (1993). See

also Hong, supranote 1, at 72 (describing the origin of the stock market in China).
6.
Records dating back about 3,500 years make China the oldest
continuous major world civilization.
1 COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD AND THEIR
LEADERS YEARBOOK 1996 at 412 (Gale Research. Inc. ed., 1996) [hereinafter
COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD]. The preamble to the PRC's 1982 Constitution begins
with the following statement: "China is one of the countries with the longest
histories in the world." XIANFA [constitution], preamble (1982), translation
availablein LEXIS. Intlaw Library, Chinalaw File, No. 141.
7.
Qian, supranote 5. at 65.
8.
XIA, supranote 4. at 61; FRANcIs A. LEES & K. THOMAS LIAw, FOREIGN
PARTICIPA7ION INCHINAs BANKING AND SECURITIES MARKET 54. 61-62 (1996).
9.
In 1949, Communist leader Mao Zedong and his armies took over the
country and established the PRC. instituting a centrally planned economy
modeled after the former Soviet Union. COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD. supra note 6, at
414. From 1953 through 1957. Chairman Mao centralized the country's economic
system under the first five-year plan through the following steps:
1. Private enterprises were first controlled and then incorporated into
state-owned enterprises;
2. Land was redistributed, then collectivized in 1955-56, and finally the

commune system was established in rural areas in 1958;
3. The currency (Yuan) was made inconvertible and external trade was
monopolized in order to insulate the economy from the possible external
effect;
4. Investment was incorporated into the planning process with the state
determining both the quantity and direction of investments;
5. The use of cash was restricted. Enterprises were forced to conduct
most of their business through account transfers with state-owned banks;
and
6. Private consumption was regulated by wage and price controls.
commodity rationing schemes, and denial of consumer credit.
XIA, supranote 4, at 19-20.
10.
Qian, supranote 5, at 64 n.8. In the 1960s and early 1970s, Chairman
Mao spearheaded the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in order to purge all
capitalist and elitist cultural influences from China. COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD,
supra note 6, at 414.
11.
This pattern of political turmoil followed by the demise of the stock
market began with the first stock exchange which opened in Shanghai in 1891
and closed in 1912 when the new Republic, founded by Dr. Sun Yat-Sen, shut
down all existing Chinese stock exchanges. Hong, supranote 1, at 72.
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12
China's ailing post-war economy in the 1950s and 1960s, postMao leaders of the PRC realized that such strict Communist rule
had stifled the country's economic development over time. Thus,
in late 1978, under the leadership of Deng Xiaopeng, 13 the
Communist Party of China (CPC) announced its "open door
policy," under which the CPC would focus its attention on
economic development, rather than class struggle. 14
The
economic reforms sought three main objectives:
(1)
to
decentralize the economy (2) to bolster reliance on market forces
and on material incentives as a means for achieving desired
economic behavior and resource allocation: and (3) to encourage
foreign investment.' 5 Following decades of economic isolation,
these pragmatic policy reforms created a literal "opening to the
outside world" for China.16

12.
Following two generations of war and social conflict, Chairman Mao
and his leaders garnered support by decreasing inflation, reviving the economy.
and repairing damaged industrial facilities. COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD, supra note
6. at 414.
13.
In August of 1977, the Chinese Communist Party reinstated Deng
Xiaoping to the government positions (the concurrent posts of Politburo Standing
Committee member. People's Liberation Army Chief of Staff. and Vice Premier) he
had held prior to his being ousted by Chairman Mao on the basis of his alleged
responsibility for political disorder, following an anti-Deng campaign organized by
Mao's wife, Jiang Qing, and three pro-Cultural Revolution accomplices (later
arrested and referred to as the "Gang of Four"). COUNTRUES OF THE WORLD, supra
note 6, at 414-15. Deng's "new, pragmatic leadership emphasized economic
development and renounced mass political movements." Id. at 415. Although the
elderly Deng had officially retired in November of 1989 and was in poor health. he
was, nevertheless, considered the "paramount leader" In China until his death on
February 19, 1997, at the age of 92. See generally Orville Schell. Deng's
Revolution, NEWSWK, Mar. 3, 1997. at 20-25 (overviewing Deng's leadership role in
China and discussing his recent death).
14.
Communique of the Third Plenum of the 11th Central Committee of the
Communist Party of China (adopted Dec. 22, 1978), cited in Donald C. Clarke,
What's Law Got to Do With It?: Legal Institutions and Economic Reform in China, 10
UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 1, 4 n.5 (1991). The main defects of the PRC's socialist
system at that time included the following:
(1) lack of clear division between the role of government and enterprise;
(2) disregard for the role of market forces causing lack of communication
between production and market forces;
(3) excessive egalitarianism in the distribution of Income preventing any
link between performance and reward; and
(4) defects in economic structure due to uniform, state-owned modes of
operation.
XIA, supra note 4. at 21.

These defects suppressed creative expression by
enterprises and individuals which consequently strengthened the need for a
centralized economy, and increased the rigidity of government which once again
suppressed creative expression. Id. at 22.
15.
XIA, supranote 4, at 22.
16.
Id. at 27. In 1982, following the promulgation of its open door policy,
China adopted a new Constitution which reads, "[tihe future of China Is closely
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The Chinese government has gradually implemented
economic reforms in the form of experiments at both local and
national levels. China initially overhauled its financial sector by
allowing the state-controlled banks to allocate financial resources
more efficiently17 and by creating non-bank financial
institutions.18
Prior to 1979, China's financial system had
consisted of only a few specialized banks 19 which had acted
merely as "the government's cashiers," while the state had
controlled almost all resource allocations. 20
The later
transformation of China's banking sector inevitably led to the re21
emergence of its financial markets.
China represents the first known example of a centrally
planned economy supporting a securities market. 2 2
China's
financial markets re-emerged primarily as a result of the
decentralization and rationalization of investment activities and
the increase in the financial autonomy of enterprises. 2 3 Debt
securities first appeared in 1981 when the PRC issued
government bonds to finance its budget deficit. 24 In the latter
half of the 1980s, the national economic policy reforms led to the
emergence of joint-stock companies and stock issuance. 2 5 After
the opening of the first over-the-counter (OTC) stock exchange in
Shenzhen on August 5, 1986, other regional markets quickly

linked with that of the whole world." XIANFA [constitution], preamble (1982),
trans/ationavailable in LEXIS, Intlaw Library, Chinalaw File, No. 141.
17.
In 1984, the People's Bank of China (PBOC) was restructured to serve
as the country's central bank, playing a dominant role in creating and
implementing monetary policies. XA, supranote 4, at 38. See also Ic. at 44-45

(table showing the major functions of financial institutions in China today).
18.
Significant experimentation is currently being undertaken

in

developing non-banking institutions such as investment and trust companies.
pension funds, and insurance companies. Id. at 46-47. However, most financial

sector activities in China are performed by the banking system. Id. at 46.
19.
The PBOC, China's principal bank, functioned as both a central and
commercial bank. Additional specialty banks included the Agricultural Bank of
China, the Construction Bank of China, the Bank of China, and the People's
Insurance Company. Id. at 36.
20.
Id. at 27-28.
21.
Id. at 37.
22.
Id. at 19.
23.
Id. at 58.
24.
Hong, supranote 1. at 73.
25.
Id. at 75. China experienced many "firsts" during this time: The first
public share certificates (1983), the first joint-stock company (July 1984), the first
joint-stock company to issue shares under a standardized shareholding limited
liability company (November 1984), and the first financial institution to adopt the
shareholding system and raise capital through the public issuance of shares
(1989). Id.
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developed in Beijing, Chongqing, Guangzhou, Shanghai 2 6
Tianjin, and Wuhan. 2 7 During this same year, a reorganized
state-owned enterprise publicly issued shares for the first time. 2 8
The subsequent emergence of the national securities exchanges
in Shanghai and Shenzhen occurred on December 19, 1990,29
and July 3. 1991,30 respectively. As of December 31, 1996, 237
and 293 joint-stock companies had listed their A-Shares on the
Shanghai and Shenzhen exchanges respectively. 3 1 Furthermore,
a total of eighty-six companies had issued their B-Shares on the
32
two exchanges.
B. Chinese Stock Market Participants

On July 1, 1994, the 1993 Company Law of China, 3 3 which
combines the Chinese socialist market economy with Western
forms of capitalism, took effect, creating a law with distinct
"Chinese characteristics." 34 The main goal of the Company Law

26.
In September of 1986, Shanghai Trust and Investment Corporation
began trading the stock of two collective enterprises. Shanghai Yanzhong
Enterprise Ltd. and Shanghai Feile Audio Co. Ltd. Qian. supranote 5. at 66 n.16.
27.
Benjamin R. Tarbutton. China-A National Regulatory Framework for
the PRC's Stock Markets Begins to Emerge. 24 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 411. 414
(1994).
28.
Shenyang Jinbei Auto Industrial Shareholding Corporation, a
reorganized shareholding company, issued stock to its employees. Id. at 414 n.19.
Although the state maintained its majority ownership position. it hoped that
employee ownership would increase productivity. Id.
29.
Shanghai Securities Exchange Opens. Xinhua News Agency. Dec. 19,
1990. available in LEXIS, News Library. Xinhua File.
30.
Shenzhen Securities Exchange Opens, Xinhua News Agency, July 3,
1991, availablein LEXIS, News Library, Xinhua File.

31.

China Has 530 Listed Companies, Xinhua News Agency, Jan. 3, 1997,

available in 1997 WL 899194.
32.
China Selects 33 More Enterprises to List B Shares. Xinhua News
Agency, Jan. 8. 1997, available in 1997 WL 8992118. In addition. 33 more jointstock companies have obtained approval to list their B-Shares on one of the two
national exchanges. Id.
33.
The Company Law of the People's Republic of China (enacted Dec. 29,
1993). reprintedin CHINAS COMPANY LAW: THE NEW LEGISLATION 9-56 (Gulguo Wang
trans., 1994) [hereinafter Company Law]. In adopting the Company Law, the
Eighth National People's Congress consulted various forms of Western corporation
law as models, although the resulting business entities are not presently
comparable to U.S. corporations.
Robert C. Art & Minkang Gu, China
Incorporated. The First CorporationLaw of the People's Republic of China, 20 YALE
J. INT'L L. 273, 274 (1995).
34.
Art & Gu,supra note 33, at 275. The unique Chinese characteristics
include:
[the] 'legal representative.' an individual who has the authority to bind a
legal entity and who is personally liable for misconduct[;] . . . an

extraordinarily extensive grant of power to shareholders and provision for a
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is to provide a unified standard for more efficient and productive
modem corporate organizations operating under non-statecontrolled management. 35 In furtherance of this multi-faceted
goal, the Company Law (as a supplement, modification. 3 6 and
codification of prior regulations) regulates the public issuance of
stock by any company organized as a "company limited by
37
shares," commonly referred to as a "joint-stock company" (JSC).
Pursuant to the Company Law, a JSC can issue shares to the
public only after obtaining permission from the State Council and
meeting fairly strict requirements, such as having a minimum of
fifty million yuan (approximately six million U.S. dollars) in
capital, having at least 1,000 shareholders, and having earned
profits during the preceding three years. 3 8 Due to the state's
retention of majority ownership in JSCs, 3 9 the Company Law
should be viewed as the catalyst for "corporatization" rather than
"privatization."40
Various types of business enterprises compose China's
The non-stock business forms currently
economic system.
41
operating in China include state-owned enterprises (SOEs).

'board of supervisors' to oversee the board of directors[;] ... workers play a
role in determining corporate policy[; and] . . . the Law relies primarily on
administrative sanctions rather than on derivative actions to deter and
punish misconduct by managers.
IcL
See Matthew D. Bersani. Privatizationand the Creation of Stock Companies in
China, 1993 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 301, 302 ("China has historically proven itself a
master at adopting western concepts and adapting them to suit its own needs.
Perhaps the most notable example of this is the transformation of Soviet
communism by the People's Republic of China (PRO) into 'communism with
Chinese characteristics'-a system strikingly different from the one on which it
was based.").
See Art & Gu, supra note 33, at 274-75 ("The primary purposes of the
35.
[Company] law are (1) to restructure the organization and management of stateowned enterprises; (2) to address serious, chronic, and seemingly intractable
problems of inefficiency; (3) to promote competition and productivity; and (4) to
remove the state from detailed management of business operations.").
36.
The Company Law superseded some central and local stock issuance
regulations. Id. at 274 n.4.
37.
See IL at 291 n. 109.
38.
Company Law. supranote 33, at art. 152.
See supranote 2.
39.
40.
Art & Gu, supra note 33, at 282-86.
41.
SOEs make up a small percentage of total enterprises, but produce a
majority (yet decreasing) percentage of China's national (primarily industrial)
production. XIA, supranote 4, at 69-71. In 1993, for example. SOEs accounted for
only 19% of China's total enterprises. However, SOEs produced 53% of all
industrial output, employed 108.7 million workers and generated 67% of the
state's revenue. Art & Gu. supranote 33, at 276-77 & n. 11. Unfortunately, about
one-third of all SOEs are losing money. Id. at 277.
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owned enterprises (COEs),42 private enterprises
and foreign investment enterprises (FIEs).4 4
Under

collectively
(PEs),

43

China's Company Law, stock companies may exist in two forms:
limited liability companies (LLCs)45 and JSCs. 4 6 These stock
companies are owned by stockholders, 4 7 managed under the
direction of a board of directors, and characterized as limited
liability enterprises. While LLCs may privately issue stock, only
JSCs may access the stock markets, 4 8 assuming they meet the

Most large SOEs are manufacturing enterprises supervised for the most part
by industrial ministries in Beijing, while the more numerous medium and smallsized SOEs may be owned by the central or local government, or jointly by both.
XIA, supra note 4. at 71. The latter SOEs have relatively more flexibility in making
decisions. Id.
42.
COEs are a combination of PEs and SOEs. XIA, supra note 4. at 71.
Most COEs are partnerships sponsored by local government whose participating
partners are responsible for raising capital, but many COEs reorganized as semiSOEs in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Id. Due to the industrial reform in the
mid-1980s, these COEs now compete for means of production and funds from
SOEs. Id. at 71-72. Between 1978 and 1988. output from COEs grew from 22% to
36% of total production. Id. at 26. In 1993, COEs employed 35.5 million workers.
Art & Gu, supranote 33, at 276 n. 11.
43.
The few PEs that survived nationalization In the early 1950s were small
service operations such as barber shops and street vendors located primarily in
eastern and southern China. XIA. supra note 4. at 72. Private enterprises
(generally small and in rural areas) emerged in great numbers in the 1980s,
totaling over six million by the end of 1989. Id. Output from private enterprises
increased dramatically between 1978 and 1988, from essentially zero to about
seven percent. Id. at 26. While generally small and in rural areas. some private
enterprises have recently grown to significant sizes. Lee B. Spencer. Jr.. Chinese
Issuers and the U.S. Market (PLI Corporate Law and Practice Course Handbook
Series. May 12-13, 1994). available in VESTLAW, PLI-COMM Database, 845
PLI/Corp 203. In 1993, China's private sector employed 14.9 million workers.
Art & Gu, supra note 33. at 276 n. 11.
44.
FIEs have exploded since the enactment of China's Foreign Investment
Law in 1979, with joint ventures between China enterprises and foreign
companies totaling over 20,000 by the end of 1991. XIA, supra note 4, at 73.
Most FIEs are organized as either equity or contractual joint ventures, but foreign
companies have also established wholly foreign-owned enterprises. Id. at 74.
45.
LLCs are similar to closely held or private corporations in the United
States, but not to U.S. limited liability companies. Art & Gu, supra note 33, at
291 & n.108. By the end of 1994, China had a total of 10.700 LLCs. Fang
Liufang, China's Corporatizaton Experiment, 5 DuKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 149, 152
n.2 (1995).
46.
JSCs also provide limited liability to their shareholders (like LLCs), but
more closely resemble larger U.S. corporations, including those whose stocks are
listed on a stock exchange. Art & Gu. supra note 33, at 291 & n.109.
47.
Enterprises owned by foreign stockholders may be subject to any of
three laws in addition to the Company Law: Law on Joint Ventures Using Chinese
and Foreign Investment, Law on Wholly Foreign-Owned Enterprises, and Law on
Chinese-Foreign Contractual Joint Ventures. Art & Gu, supra note 33, at 291 &
n. 111 (citing translations of these laws available in LEXIS, Intlaw Library,
Chinaaw File, Nos. 41, 345, 463).
48.
Company Law, supranote 33, at art. 99.
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relevant national and local regulations in force at the time of the
issue. 4 9 Non-stock enterprises, including SOEs. cannot issue
stock, unless they do so through a stock-form holding company
50
or reorganize into an LLC or JSC before such issuance.
Both national and foreign investors may participate in the
Chinese stock markets, although they must purchase different
types of shares. Chinese individuals can own the A-Shares of a
company, while foreign investors 5 ' can purchase B-Shares. The
first B-Shares, which are denominated in reminbi, but traded in
foreign currency, 5 2 began trading on the Shanghai and Shenzhen
Exchanges in February of 1992. 53
A-Shares trade among
domestic shareholders on various local or OTC markets as well as
the national stock exchanges. B-Shares, on the other hand,
trade only on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges
among foreign investors. Besides these differences, A and B
54
shareholders enjoy the same rights.
Upon regulatory approval by the state, Chinese companies
may also list their stock on foreign exchanges, such as in Hong
Kong5 5 or the United States.5 6 For investors weary of the

49.
See infra note 176 and accompanying text.
50.
Spencer. supra note 43. See Art & Gu. supra note 33. at 292-93
("When the sole investor in an LLC is from a state investment company or
department, the LLC is termed a 'wholly state-owned company' . . . [which] is
essentially an administrative unit of a government agency. clothed in a corporate
form.").
51.
Foreign investors include foreign residents and foreign investment
corporations both inside and outside China. Qian, supranote 5. at 90 & n. 110.
52.
On the Shanghai Exchange, B-Shares trade in Hong Kong dollars,
while on the Shenzhen Exchange. B-Shares trade in U.S. dollars. Craig S. Smith,
China Struggles to Attract Foreignersto Manic-Depressive Class B Shares, WALL ST.
J.. Jan. 17, 1997, atA7.
53.
Andrew Browne, Shanghai Buries Ideology, Promotes Stocks, Reuter
Library Rep., Feb. 23, 1992 (discussing the Issuance of B-Shares on the Shanghai
Exchange by Shanghai Vacuum Electron Device Co.) available in LEXIS, News
Library, Txtnws File; B SharesSell Briskly in Shenzhen, Xinhua News Agency, Feb.
28, 1992 (discussing the issuance of B-Shares on the Shenzhen Exchange by
Southern Glass. Ltd.), available in LEXIS, News Library, Xinhua File. To date, 86
companies have issued B-Shares on the two stock exchanges in Shanghai and
Shenzhen. ChinaSelects 33 More Enterprises,supranote 32.
54.
Qian, supranote 5. at 90.
55.
Chinese joint-stock companies may list H-Shares on the Hong-Kong
Stock Exchange. Today, a total of 23 companies have listed H-Shares. Chinese
Petrochemical Giant Sells Shares in Hong Kong, Xinhua News Agency, Jan. 13,

1997, available in 1997 WL 8992266.
56.
In October of 1992, Brilliance China Automotive Holdings became the
first Chinese company, via Bermuda, to be listed on the New York Stock Exchange
(NYSE). Today, only two Chinese companies are listed on the NYSE. For general
information about the various American Depository Receipts (ADR) programs
available in the United States, see Investors PreferBonds, CHINA ECON. REV., Aug.
1, 1996, available in 1996 WL 9692286.
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speculative Chinese stock markets, these investment alternatives
are attractive because they provide the upside of China's strong
economic growth without the unpredictability of its still emerging
stock market. Section IV suggests some steps China should take
to increase the efficiency and stability of the Chinese stock
markets in order to attract these important foreign investors.
C. CurrentLegal Frameworkfor the Stock Markets

Since 1979, China has undergone a major transformation of
its legal system, characterized by one commentator as a shift
from "policy and propriety" to "codified law and legal
institutions."5 7 Within this general transformation, the legal
framework supporting the securities markets has evolved from a
regional to a national base of laws, rules, and regulations. Until
the enactment of provisional national securities laws and the
Company Law in 1993, the central government and
municipalities competed for control over the emerging financial
markets, resulting in confusing and potentially contradictory
regulatory measures.5 8 This legal transformation was in part the
PRC's intention:
With a view to ensuring the smooth progress of the reform of the
economic structure and the implementation of the open policy, the
Third Session of the Sixth National People's Congress has decided
to authorize the State Council to formulate, promulgate and
implement, whenever necessary. interim provisions or regulations
concerning the reform. .. [which] shall be made into law by the
National People's Congress or its Standing Committee after they are
59
tested in practiceand when conditions are ripe.

Today, the national securities laws, which are still far from
comprehensive, are implemented locally and supplemented by
detailed, and sometimes stricter, municipal and exchange
measures inShanghai and Shenzhen.
The open door policy introduced in 1979 did not envision an
efficient, capitalist stock market.
Rather, the central

57.
norms (Zi)
pressures
legislative

Art & Gu, supra note 33, at 274. Under Confucius teachings, social
are superior to formal laws (fa). Id. at 274 n.5. However, due to
by foreign investors, the National People's Congress (NPC). the
branch of the PRC, has codified many social standards into legislation.

Id. In 1995, the NPC was involved in drafting or deliberating over 150 laws, about
one-third of which were economic regulations. Id. at 274 n.6.
58.
Wong, supranote 2. at 1235-36.
59.
Decision of the Third Session of the Sixth National People's Congress
on Authorizing the State Council to Formulate Interim Provisions or Regulations

Concerning the Reform of the Economic Structure and the Open Policy (issued
April 10, 1985). translationavailable in LEXIS, Intlaw Library, Chinalaw File, No.
276 (emphasis added).
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government's primary motive behind the development of an
equity market was to raise capital to support China's ailing state
enterprises and to curb inflation by decreasing consumer
spending through the channeling of personal savings into capital
investment. 60 Likewise, China's securities laws reflect the desire

to

effectuate

economic

modernization

without having

to

relinquish state control-a situation that shall be referred to as
the "counter-socialist dilemma."
In 1983, the State Council of the PRC officially recognized the
issuance of corporate stock to employees of collective enterprises
61
as well as the reorganization of SOEs into shareholding entities.
By late 1986, under the supervision of local branches of the
People's Bank of China (PBOC),6 2 governments in Beijing,
Guangdong province, and Xiamen special economic zone had
passed separate regulations defining the concept of stocks and
prescribing the eligibility requirements for issuing stocks,
procedures for such issuance, and guidelines for stock transfers
and dividend distributions. 6 3 In the midst of this widespread
local growth, on March 27, 1987, the State Council promulgated
the first national securities regulation entitled, "Interim
Regulations Governing the Issuance of Bonds for State-Owned
64
which
Enterprises" (hereinafter 1987 Interim Regulations),
any
lacked
conspicuously
authorized SOEs to issue bonds and
the
State
reference to stock issuance. On the following day,
Council released the Directive of the State Council on
Reinforcement of Administration on Stocks and Bonds
(hereinafter 1987 Directive)6 5 which set forth only three
circumstances under which enterprises could issue stock: (1)
issuance by COEs, subject to control by the national government;
(2) issuance by SOEs, which had issued public stock prior to the

60.
61.

Wong, supranote 2, at 1240-41.
1983 Interim Provisions of the State Council on Several Policy Issues

Concerning Urban Collective Economy (issued March 14, 1983), cited in Jianfu
Chen. Securitisationof State-Owned Enterprises and Ownership Controversy in the
PRC, 15 SYDNEY L. REV. 59. 60-61 & n.9 (1993).
Tarbutton. supra note 27, at 414-15. "The PBOC was authorized to
62.

regulate stocks, bonds, and negotiable instruments, and to administer the PRC's

financial markets under Article 5, §11, of the Interim Regulations of Banks of
1986." Id. at 415 n.26.
XIA, supranote 4, at 64.
63.
Interim Regulations Governing the Issuance of Bonds for State-Owned
64.
Enterprises (promulgated March 27, 1987), translationavailable in XIA, supra note
4, at 167-72.
For a description of the Directive of the State Council on Reinforcement
65.
of Administration on Stocks and Bonds (promulgated March 28, 1987), see Harry
Zheng. Securities Regulation in China: Development and Conflicts, E. ASIAN EXEC.
REP., May 15, 1987, availablein LEXIS, News Library. Easian File.
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1987 Directive, upon PBOC approval 6 6 and (3) issuance through
horizontal investments between enterprises. 6 7 This restrictive
regulation represents a tightening of the reigns by the PRC
compared

to

its

former

open

experimentation

with

stock

issuance.
In the early 1990s, two national stock exchanges emerged
under different regulations promulgated by the local PBOC
branches in Shanghai and Shenzhen.6 8 The first national stock
exchange opened in Shanghai on December 19. 1990. under the
Provisional Measures of Shanghai Municipality for Administration
of the Issue and Trading of Shares (hereinafter Shanghai
Measures).6 9 The Shenzhen Stock Exchange began trading soon
thereafter on July 3. 1991. under the Provisional Measures of
Shenzhen Municipality for Administration of the Issue and
Trading of Shares (hereinafter Shenzhen Measures).7o
By
comparison, the Shanghai Measures were less restrictive than the
Shenzhen Measures and thus offered greater financing
opportunities for small to medium-sized companies interested in
accessing the stock market. 7 1 Both exchanges subsequently
issued regulations with regard to the issuance of B-Shares to
foreigners. 7 2
Subsequent national legislation adopted these
detailed regional legal measures in large part. 7 3
In October of 1992. due to fraud and abuse problems 74
associated with the lack of unity between the Shanghai and

66.
Reorganized shareholding SOEs. which had experimentally issued
stock only to employees, issued public stock subsequent to this Directive on the
basis of this permissive grant. Tarbutton. supranote 27. at 414 n.24 (referring to
this practice as taking advantage of "a loophole" in the 1987 Directive).
67.
Id. at 414 n.23.

68.

The regulatory differences reflect the lack of cooperation between the

Shanghai and Shenzhen branches of the PBOC which controlled the stock
exchanges. Id. at 415-16.
69.
For a detailed summary of these measures, see 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
CHINESE LAW 358-59 (Chris Hunter et al., ed.. Asia Law & Practice Ltd., 1993). See
also Tarbutton, supra note 27. at 416-20 (describing the Shanghai Measures In
terms of stock Issuance, disclosure requirements, and insider trading).
70.
For a detailed summary of these measures, see 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
CHINESE LAW, supra note 69. at 295-96. See also Tarbutton, supra note 27, at
416-20 (describing the Shenzhen Measures in terms of stock issuance, disclosure
requirements, and insider trading).
71.
Tarbutton, supranote 27, at 418.
72.
See ShanghaiIssues Regulations on B Shares, Xinhua General Overseas
News Service, Jan. 11. 1992, availablein LEXIS, News Library, Xinhua File.
73.
See Qian, supra note 5, at 86-91 (providing an overview of the legal
frameworks in Shanghai and Shenzhen).
74.
Significant fraud and abuse occurred under the decentralized
leadership of the PBOC, prompting citizen riots in Shenzhen on August 10, 1992.
David Holley & Christine Courtney, Would-Be CapitalistsRiot in China Protests,
L.A. TIMES, Aug. 11, 1992. at 10 (describing the outbreak as "the most serious
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Shenzhen Measures, the State Council Securities Committee

(SCSC) and China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC)
75

replaced the PBOC in regulating China's securities industry.
The SCSC is the policy-making body whose regulations are
implemented by the CSRC. 76 Pursuant to its responsibilities, the
SCSC promulgated the Interim Regulations on the Issue and
Trading of Shares (hereinafter 1993 Interim Regulations) on April
22, 1993, in its first major attempt to create a national securities
law. 77 Similar to the restrictive 1987 Directive, the 1993 Interim

Regulations restricted corporate stock issuance to "a limitedliability company that has already been established 7 8 or a

public disturbance in China since the 1989 crackdown on the pro-democracy
movement in Beijing.").
75.
Tarbutton. supra note 27. at 420. The CSRC has also been translated
as the China Securities Supervision Commission. See 1993 Interim Regulations,
supra note 2. at art. 5.
76.
Tarbutton, supranote 27, at 420 & n.73.
77.
See 1993 Interim Regulations, supra note 2. Article 5 of the 1993
Interim Regulations includes a description of the SCSC (". . . the national
organization in charge of the country's securities market [which] exercises a
unified management of the securities markets across the country according to
relevant laws and regulations") and the China Securities Supervision Commission
[hereinafter CSSC] (-. . . an ex4cutive body which exercises supervision and
management for the [SCSCI [which] manages and supervises according to relevant
laws and regulations the specific activities of the issue and trading of securities").
IL at ch. 1. art. 5.
78.
Id- at ch. 2. art. 7. The 1993 Interim Regulations do not explicitly
define the term "limited liability company," but it requires an established limited
liability company "that openly issues stock" to meet the following conditions:
(1) Its production and operation conform to the government industrial
policies;
(2) It will issue only one kind of common stock, and the right of the stock
Is the same for all holders;
(3) The initiator of the stock shall be committed to buying no less than
35% of the total stock that the company plans to issue;
(4) Of the total stock that the company plans to issue, the value of the
stock that the initiator is committed to buy shall be no less than 30m
yuan, unless the government stipulates otherwise;
(5) The portion of the stock issued among the public shall be no less than
25% of the total stock that the company plans to issue; the portion that
the workers and staff members of the company are committed to buy shall
not exceed 10% of the issue for the public; if the planned stock issue of a
company exceeds 400m yuan in value, the Securities Supervision
Commission may consider the circumstances according to relevant
stipulations to lower the proportion of the issue for the public, but the
issue for the public shall be no less than 10% of the total planned stock
Issue of the company;
(6) The initiator must not have any major law violation record in last three
years; and
(7) Other conditions stipulated by the Securities Commission.
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limited-liability company to be established, 7 9 of which the
establishment has been approved by the authorities."8 0
In
addition, the 1993 Interim Regulations set forth fairly lengthy
1
stock trading,8 2
regulations concerning stock issuance,8
takeovers of listed companies,8 3 custody, liquidation and
ownership transfer,8 4 disclosure requirements for listed
companies,8 5 investigations and penalties, 8 6 and arbitration of
disputes. 8 7 Both the 1993 Interim Regulations and the Company
Law8 8 of China (effective on July 1, 1994), which include certain
stock issuance provisions, codified, modified, and replaced prior
regional regulations.8

9

However, the Shenzhen and Shanghai

exchanges and municipal regulations still serve an important role
in implementing and supplementing the provisional national
90
laws.
In December of 1995 and May of 1996, the CSRC
promulgated national regulations and detailed rules respectively
governing the issue of B-Shares. 9 ' The regulations focus on how

Id. at ch. 2, art. 8. See supra notes 45-46 (describing LLCs and JSCs, both of
which are limited liability companies).
79.
Enterprises reorganized as LLCs must meet not only Article 8
conditions. supranote 78, but also the following requirements:
(1) Their net assets should account for no less than 30% of their total
assets and their intangible assets should account for no more than 20% of
their net assets at the end of the year before the stock Issue. However.
this condition does not apply if other regulations are provided by the
Securities Commission and
(2) They have earned profits for the past three years in a row. If the
limited-liability companies established by reorganized state enterprises
issue stocks to the public, the apportionment of the shares held by the
state among the total amount of capital stock to be Issued shall be
stipulated by the State Council or by the department authorized by the
State Council.
1993 Interim Regulations, supranote 2. at ch. 2,art. 9.
80.
Id.at ch. 2, art. 7.
81.
Id. at ch. 2, arts. 7-28.
82.
Id. at ch. 3. arts. 29-45.
83.
Id. at ch. 4,arts. 46-52.
84.
Id. at ch. 5, arts. 53-56.
85.
Id. at ch. 6. arts. 57-67.
86.
Id. at ch. 7,arts. 68-78.
87.
Id. at ch. 8,arts. 79-80.
88.
See Company Law, supranote 33.
89.
Wong, supranote 2, at 1236-37; Spencer, supranote 43 (describing the
Company Law).
90.
Liufang, supra note 45, at 161. Therefore, the validity of local rules
depend on the corresponding central laws or administrative regulations behind
them. Id.
91.
FirstChineseNationalRules on B-Shares, Xinhua News Agency, Jan. 3,
1996. available in 1996 WL 3774131; Law: B-Share Rules. CHINA ECON. REV.. Sept.
1,1996. availablein 1996 WL 9692325.
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to list B-Shares, while the rules set forth guidelines for the
trading of B-Shares, the qualifications of institutions handling
securities, the procedures for accounting and auditing, and the
disclosure of information generally. 9 2
Under these recent
national rules, B-Shares may be issued to foreign legal persons or
institutions, individuals, legal persons and institutions in Hong
Kong, Macao, and Taiwan. Chinese citizens living outside China,
and

others

approved by

the SCSC. 9 3

The effect of the

enforcement of such rules and regulations has been a slowing of
market expansion and a decrease in the number of B-Share
listings. 9 4 However, Chinese officials hope such implementation,
in the long run, will lead to higher quality offerings and a more
efficient B-Share market. 95
Furthermore, in late June of 1996, the SCSC promulgated
rules governing the underwriting of A-Share issues. 9 6 These
rules prescribe, among other things, that lead underwriters must
have assets of at least fifty million yuan (about six million U.S.
dollars) and have underwritten at least three stock issues or have
at least three years of underwriting experience; that an
underwriter must not have violated any laws in the past year; and
that an underwriter must not encourage companies to issue
shares at "unreasonably high" prices and may not retain shares
gained through illegal means. 9 7 These recently released A and BShare rules and regulations are the most recent examples of
China's effort in forming a unified national legal framework for its
securities industry.
However, until the National People's
Congress enacts a comprehensive national securities law, a
labyrinth of local and national rules and regulations9 8 will
continue to control China's stock market activities.

92.
93.
94.

Laws: B-Share Rules, supranote 91.
FirstChineseNationalRules on B-Shares, supranote 91.
Law: B-Share Rules, supranote 91.

95.

Id.

96.
Id.
97.
Id.
98.
See Qian, supranote 5, at 68-70 (describing the legal framework as one
part of an emerging tripartite regulatory regime having an institutional
(professional securities finns and stock exchanges), legal (rules and regulations),
and administrative (agencies) framework). For descriptions of the local and
national securities laws enacted through December of 1994, see 1-2 ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF CHINESE LAW, supranote 69.
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D. Sino-U.S. Cooperation
As early as 1986, Chinese leaders invited Wall Street experts
to China to explain to them the U.S. capital markets. 9 9 Based on
the existence of Chinese regulations which reflect aspects of the

Western capitalist market model, Chinese officials have obviously
observed the stock market experiences of countries like the
United States. In 1994, the United States formally offered China
its assistance in the development of a national Chinese securities
law
by
entering
into
a
Sino-U.S.
Memorandum
of
Understanding.1 0 0 This short document has no binding effect of
law, yet it stands as a significant symbol of China's commitment
to the development of a comprehensive national securities law to
support its market socialist economy. The Memorandum of
Understanding sets forth specific ways in which the United States
could aid China in developing its securities regulatory framework,
including the Securities and Exchange Commission's assistance
in drafting laws and regulations and in conducting training
sessions in China or the United States, and internship programs
for CSRC personnel.' 0 '
In 1995, Morgan Stanley & Company entered into a joint
venture with the People's Construction Bank and several other
partners forming China International Capital Corporation.' 0 2 As
a result. Morgan Stanley became the first U.S. investment bank
0 3
allowed to participate in China's domestic capital market.
China hopes that allowing Morgan Stanley inside the protected
Chinese markets will benefit China in terms of securities
experience and market development.' 0 4
Based on China's
acceptance of Morgan Stanley's presence, Sino-U.S. cooperation
is likely to grow in the future.

99.

Nikos A. Stamos.

China's Nascent Securities Market:

Some

Observations, 10 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POLY 691, 691 (1988).
100.
Memorandum of Understanding Between the United States Securities
and Exchange Commission and the China Securities Regulatory Commission
Regarding Cooperation, Consultation, and the Provision of Technical Assistance,
April 28, 1994 [hereinafter Memorandum of Understanding], reprinted In
Practising Law Institute: Corporate Law and Practice Course Handbook Series,
The SEC Speaks in 1995: InternationalDevelopments, March 3-4, 1995, available
inwESTLAW, PLI-CORP Database. 882 PLI/Corp 193.
101.
Id. §§ 7-8.
102.
Dave Lindorff, In Beyiing, the Long March is Just Starting, Bus. WK., Feb.
12, 1996, at 68.
103.
Id.
104.
Id.
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E. Recent Stock Market Update
In 1996, following a lackluster market in 1995. 207 Chinese
companies listed their shares on the country's two stock markets,

increasing the total to 530 companies with publicly traded AShares.1 0 5 The stock market saw significant improvement in
1996 compared to 1995, with a total turnover of 4.2 trillion yuan
(about 505 billion U.S. dollars) last year, more than six times that
in 1995.106 The number of stock investors rose by more than
eight million, reaching twenty million in 1996.107 Upon the
recent announcement of the death of China's paramount leader,
Deng Xiaoping, stocks on the Shenzhen and Shanghai exchanges
fell sharply, but they recovered most of the lost ground in
subsequent trading. 10 8
In contrast to recent A-Share performance, China's B-Share
markets showed "manic-depressive" tendencies in 1996.109
There was little change in B-Share trading until late 1996, when
domestic investors dominated the market, in violation of
regulations mandating only foreign investors, and drove prices up
eighty percent over prior levels." I0
Subsequent warnings by
regulators to enforce the foreigners-only rule resulted in about a
thirty percent plummet in B-Share prices."' Eighty-six Chinese
companies have issued and listed B-Shares on the two stock
exchanges, and thirty-three new B-Share listings are currently
2
expected.' 1
To the surprise of many, news of Deng's death resulted in a
2.3 percent surge in Hong Kong stocks. 113 Some attributed such
reaction to investors' indifference to Deng's death, while others
14
speculated that "the rally was driven by local Chinese buying."
In January, prior to Deng's death, the Xinhua News Agency
reported a "substantial rise" in the Heng Seng China Enterprise
Index, which tracks the overall performance of twenty-three
Chinese state firms listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, due

105.
106.

ChinaHas 530 Listed Companies, supranote 31.
Id.

107.

Id.

108.
Sara Webb & Leslie Chang, Hong Kong Stocks Surge 2.3% on Deng's
Death,WALL ST. J., Feb. 21, 1997, at C12.
109.
Smith, supranote 52.
110.
Id.
111.
Id.
112.
China Selects 33 More Enterprisesto List B Shares, supranote 32. Since
December of 1995, when the central government took control of the B-Share
market through the promulgation of B-Share regulations, the listing of B-Shares
has been subject to approval by the SCSC rather than local regulators. Id.
113. Webb & Chang, supra note 108.
114.
Id.
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to investors' positive anticipation of Hong Kong's return to
5
China.11
Just as before Deng's death, political uncertainty continues
to be a risk factor in investing in the Chinese stock market.

Some analysts are quite enthusiastic about the future of China's
stock market in this post-Deng environment: "'iTihe confirmation
of Deng's demise ... creates a clear buying opportunity.'"1 6 Yet,
others believe that unless China adopts a more liberal political
agenda, the market's enthusiasm will not last. 17 While the mood
is somewhat upbeat at the moment, grave risk still remains: "The
fate of financial-market reforms as well as the post-Deng political
succession ... remain up in the air."" 18 The following sections
address such concerns and suggest ways to strengthen China's
stock market so that it can weather the potential political storms
ahead.
III. Is CHINA COMMITrED TO LONG-TERM CAPITALIST MARKET
REFORMS? THE COuNTER-SocIAusT DILEMMA

Since the opening of China's economy in 1979, the country's
Communist leaders have struggled to maintain a careful balance
between economic growth and state control in developing its
"market socialist economy." The PRC leadership under Deng
Xiaoping welcomed the economic rejuvenation resulting from
opening China to capitalist forces, but not without serious
reservations regarding the loss of state control and "ownership of
the means of production by the people" which is fundamental to
its Communist political ideology. As stated earlier, this balancing
act (or perhaps conundrum) shall be referred to as China's
"counter-socialist dilemm " l'a.9 This section examines whether

115. ChinesePetrochemicalGiantSells Shares in Hong Kong, supranote 55.
116. Webb & Chang. supra note 108 (quoting Christopher Wood, Asian and
emerging market strategist at Peregrine Securities International, Ltd.).

* 117.

Id. (describing this viewpoint as expressed by Mark Mobius, president

of Franklin Resources, Inc.'s Templeton Emerging Markets Fund).
118. Dave Lindorfl & William Glasgall, Bulls in the China Shop, Bus. WK.,
Jan. 22, 1996, at 82.

119.

Another author has described the Chinese leaders as "riding two

horses, so to speak. One horse wishes to go in the traditional direction of public
ownership; the other horse wants to take an untrod path toward complete
privatization." Qian, supranote 5, at 97. Unless the fall of communism bestows
China, Chinese leaders will not likely ever ride off into the direction of
privatization. However, resolving the counter-socialist dilemma In such a way
that an internationally competitive stock market can exist in Chinas reformed
socialist society will enable Chinese leaders to continue riding both horses down
one mutually agreeable course.
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China has a long-term commitment to resolving this dilemma in
order to develop an internationally recognized stock market.
China's counter-socialist dilemma is rooted in the conflict
between socialist and capitalist economic theory. Is it feasible for
China to develop a successful and efficient capitalist stock
market within its "socialist market economy"? Marxist-Leninist
ideology, as expressed in China's 1982 Constitution, is based on
"socialist public ownership of the means of production, namely,
ownership by the whole people and collective ownership by the
working people"' 2 0 and shuns the capitalist "system of
exploitation of man by man." 12 1 Providing welfare services to its
employees has traditionally been one of the primary functions of
a Chinese SOE, 122 rather than the maximization of profits. In
contrast, capitalism is "an economic system characterized by
private or corporate ownership of capital goods. by investments
that are determined by private decision rather than by state
control, and by prices, production, and the distribution of goods
12 3
that are determined mainly by competition in a free market."
While, in theory, socialism and capitalism seem to be mutually
exclusive economic systems. China has imported restricted
elements of private ownership in such a way as to form a
"socialist
market
economy"
having
unique
"Chinese
24
characteristics."'
Evidence exists both for and against the continuation of swift
capitalist economic reforms in China. Therefore, any prediction
of the long-term outlook of post-Deng Chinese leaders reflects to
some extent the views of the speaker who, to borrow a familiar
Western expression, may view the half-filled glass as half-empty
or half-full. In stock trading jargon, it depends on whether the
speaker is "short" or "long" on Chinese economic reform. This
section reviews the evidence supporting the long-term intentions
of those in power and offers predictions based on this author's
"half-full" view of the Chinese stock market.
Certain signs suggest that China's controlling Communist
Party leaders take a short-term or restricted view of the recent

120. XIANFA [constitution] art. 6 (1982), translationavailable in LEXIS, Intlaw
Library, Chinalaw File, No. 141.
121.
Id.
122.
See Art & Gu, supra note 33, at 278 & n.21 ("Chinese enterprises
routinely provide their workers with housing, medical care, pensions, and a host

of other social services and benefits as part of the 'iron rice bowl' of lifetime
employment and social benefits.").
123.
124.

WEBsTER's THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DIcTIONARY 332 (1993).
Qian, supranote 5, at 92.
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emergence of the stock market. 125 Those holding this view are
usually referred12 to as the old Communist "hard-liners" or
"conservatives." 6 There is evidence of political infighting among
Chinese officials with regard to the open door economic reforms
as well as manifestations of a mounting conservative backlash,
leading some to suggest that the hard-liners will attempt to seize
control. 12 7 Such a backlash could bury the still nascent stock
market alongside Deng. Furthermore, Jiang Zemin, Deng's
designated successor, has been characterized as "by nature a
Marxist-Leninist" who "might be tempted to move toward tighter
political controls even as he continues to promote a more open
28
economy."1
One commentator has suggested that, based on the 1987
Directive, which greatly restricted the issuance of stock, "it
became apparent that government policy regarding the securities
market was more oriented toward solving short-term problems
than encouraging long-term development of the market." 12 9
While subsequent legislation and policies' 30 have broadened
stock issuance regulations since 1987, issuers' access to the
stock market is still quite limited, 13 1 and corporate control largely
remains in the hands of the state. 13 2 Since an internationally
recognized stock market demands significant independence from
state control, based on Western economic theory, this continued
retention of state control evidences a power wielded by the
conservatives to prevent the development of such a market. Such
control inhibits the stock market, which was originally
established to help fund SOEs, from helping to assuage the state
sector's increasing economic difficulties. 13 3

125.

Such views imply that such capitalist experimentation is temporary or

will remain Inefficient or at an internationally insignificant level under the tight
control of the state.
126. See infra notes 138-40 and accompanying text.
127. See Sheryl WuDunn, Can Deng's Heirs Finish the Long March to
Capitalism?.N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21. 1997, at A9.
128. Richard Bernstein, Chinese Exiles Wonder How Wind Will Blow, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 21, 1997, atA9.
129. XIA, supranote 4, at 65.
130. See Liufang, supranote 45, at 153-54 (noting the beneficial elements of
the "more open rules" enacted locally in the mid-1980s, as compared to the
.standards" implemented in the 1990s by the central government).
131. Id. at 212-16.
132. Id. at 202-04, 223-28.
See Wong, supra note 2. at 1226
("Notwithstanding the current interest in increasing private participation in the
state enterprise modernization process, it is clear from the Chinese Constitution
and other laws that the govermnent will not relinquish all of its ownership Interest
in this sector.").
133.
See Wong, supra note 2. at 1225-29.
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The most obvious example of anti-reform sentiment occurred
with bloodshed on June 4, 1989, in Tiananmen Square.
Following the thwarted attempts by ex-Premier Zhao Ziyang to
accelerate price reform 13 4 and the death of Hu Yaobang, a protege
of Deng and strong supporter of reform, students filled
Tiananmen Square in April of 1989 to mourn his death and to
protest against the slowing of economic reforms by Communist

hard-liners. 13 5 When students refused to cease their protesting,
the Chinese military, under Deng's orders, moved in with tanks
and other armaments, killing hundreds, perhaps even
36
thousands.
Less violent anti-reform measures have been taken with the
support of conservatives, such as those in the Chen Yun faction,
who argue that capitalism will lead to corruption, speculation,
and nepotism, undermining respect for the Communist Party.
This faction believes that the ultimate failure of the economic
reforms will result in masses of dissatisfied profit-seeking citizens
and weakened Communist Party power.' 37 Last year, certain
headlines evidenced this conservatism:
"New Muscle, New
Boldness:
Hard-Liners Set Tone for a Society in Story
Change," 138 "China's Alarming Leap Backward," 13 9 and "A Chill
Wind Blows From Beijing." 140 In the name of protecting socialism
and communism, China performed threatening military
maneuvers off the coast of Taiwan, cracked down on religious
groups and human rights activists, and restricted the flow of
financial information.141 Some hard-liners support a retreat from
the bold reforms advocated by Deng, pointing to social instability
fed by unpaid workers' salaries, rising unemployment and falling
standards of living in the poor inland provinces, and an
increasingly wealthy minority. 14 2 New Communist propaganda
has circulated within the party warning that capitalist reforms
will allow foreigners and an emerging "bourgeoisie" to buy

134.
Instead of this price reform, in 1988, the government initiated an
"'economic adjustment' program" based on inflationary fears under which bank
credit availability decreased and operational controls on corporate entities
tightened. XIA, supranote 4, at 26-27.
135.

COUNTRIES OFTHE WORLD, supra note 6, at 415.

136. Id.
137.
Id. at 416.
138. Uli Schmetzer, New Muscle, New Boldness: Hard-Liners Set Tone for a
Society in Stormy Change, CHIC. TRIB., Feb. 18, 1996, at 1.
139.
China'sAlarming Leap Backward, Bus. WK., Jan. 29, 1996, at 84.
140.
Joyce Bamathan et al.. A Chill Wind Blows From Beying, Bus. WK., Jan.
15, 1996, at 44.
141.
See Schmetzer, supra note 138; China's Alarming Leap Backward,
supranote 139.
142.
See Barnathan. supranote 140.
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national assets and disband the Communist Party. 14 3 Today,
following Deng's death, uncertainty pervades with such headlines
as "Chinese Exiles Wonder How Wind Will Blow" 14 4 and "Can
"145
Deng's Heirs Finish the Long March to Capitalism?
One recently enacted conservative policy will negatively affect
China's stock market. In January of 1996. the state mandated
that the Xinhua News Agency, operating under the State Council,
assume the role of "gatekeeper" for all foreign business.
economic, financial news and data. 14 6 While the exact motives of
the censorship policy are unclear, 1 4 7 it "'could have significant

implications for the ability of Chinese business and financial
institutions to compete in world financial markets through equal
access to essential information.'" 14 8 As discussed below, such
state censorship of financial information inhibits China from
49
developing an efficient national stock market. 1
In contrast to these foreboding signals from conservative
Communist leaders, equally telling evidence supports the
continuation of promising economic reforms.
Despite the
conservatives' fear of becoming politically obsolete, they cannot
stop the momentum of economic reform. Economic reform has
been gaining momentum since 1979, without incurring great
political, social, and economic hardship, which is presumedly

what the conservatives are trying to avoid. At worst, they can
slow down the change, but it is change nevertheless. One
commentator noted, "When the Chinese leadership debates how
to introduce capital markets or dissolve inefficiencies in the state
sector, the debate is not over whether these steps are allowable.
Instead, they are about the concrete process of how to go about
1 50
orchestrating the change."

143.
Schmetzer. supranote 138.
144.
Bernstein. supranote 128.
145. WuDunn, supranote 127.
146. Joseph Kahn. Media: China Chokes Flow of News About Business, WALL
ST. J., Jan. 17, 1996, at BI (describing the state's censorship policy as "Draconian
restrictions").
147. Id.
[I]t wasn't immediately clear whether the mandate amounted to a strategic
rethinking of part of China's historic opening to the outside world or was
simply an attempt by the country's monopoly wire service to protect its turf
and increase Its income. It was also unclear whether the policy received
broad support from China's top leaders, who have been emphasizing the
Importance of China's economic integration with the world.
Id.
148.
Id. (quoting Peter Kann, the Chairman and CEO of Dow Jones & Co.).
See infra Part IV.B.
149.
See infra Part IV.B.
150.
WuDunn, supranote 127.
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A flashback to 1992 shows political and regulatory activity
signaling that capitalism is in China to stay. In January of 1992,
Deng Xiaoping called for "bold experiments" with the stock
market.' 5 ' In February of 1992. the first B-Shares were issued to
foreigners on China's two stock exchanges. 15 2
Until this
monumental reversal, foreign investors had been banned from
participating in China's stock markets since 1949.
A U.S.
reporter captured the sentiment of the day: "But not until 'B'
shares changed hands was it clear that China's leaders have
swallowed their deepest fears about private property and
committed themselves to share ownership. . . . 'It signals to
foreigners the [open door] policy is real and not just
propaganda.'"' 53
The state-controlled news service recently
confirmed that "[ilt is China's long-term policy to raise foreign
capital on securities markets." 15 4
Moreover, securities
authorities announced in 1995 that attracting foreign investors to

the Chinese stock market was a priority for them. 15 5 In 1996, the
Chairman of the CSRC, Zhou Daojing, announced that regulators
would choose prospective B-Share issuers on a nationwide basis
in order to develop the B-Share market.' 5 6 As promised, the
SCSC recently approved thirty-three companies from various
57
industries to list B-Shares on China's stock exchanges.1
Furthermore, while the government's recent move to control
the flow of foreign financial news into China is problematic in that
it contributes to market inefficiency, it is possible that profits, not
politics, are behind its censorship policy since a fee is charged for
the examination and approval of foreign news agencies' ability to
publish economic information in China. 158 As a part of China's
economic reforms, Beijing is cutting Xinhua News Agency's

151.

QIan, supra note 5, at 66 & n.17 (citing Top Ten News Stories for

China'sSecurities Industry, Xinhua News Agency, Jan. 3, 1993, available in LEXIS,
News Library, Xinhua File). See Bersani, supranote 34, at 301 (quoting Deng on
his 1992 tour of southern China: "Are securities and stock markets good or bad?
Is there any danger in adopting such things? Do they exist exclusively in
capitalism? Can they also be adopted in a socialist system? People are allowed to
consider such matters further, but resolute action must be taken to experiment
with such things.").
152.
See supranote 53 & accompanying text.
153. Browne, supranote 53.
154.
Fund Raising on Stock Markets Is China's Long-Term Policy, Xinhua

News Agency, Nov. 9, 1995, availablein 1995 WL 7715940.
155. B Share Issue to Go National, Xinhua News Agency, Feb. 6, 1996,

availabLe in 1996 WL 3775131.
156. Id. Such a "nationwide" B-Share policy addresses the conservatives'
concerns for geographic disparity in economic prosperity.
157.
China Selects 33 More Enterprisesto List B Shares, supranote 32.
158.
Finance News: In Brief, CHINA ECON. REv., May 1, 1996, available in
1996 WL 9692231.
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government subsidies by seven percent annually in an effort to
make media organizations less reliant upon government
handouts and to force them to compete for profits. One Xinhua
representative stated that the organization welcomes the
opportunity to share in the revenues of the foreign economic
news services. 15 9 Furthermore, officials reason that the media
coverage regulations are intended to prevent false reporting from
influencing the market. 160 Such a policy promotes the accuracy
and efficiency of the securities market.
The rapid speed of China's economic reforms is also
impressive and unparalleled among the development of emerging
markets. A look at the B-Share trading, for example, evidences

the sheer swiftness of China's reforms.

While other Eastern

European and Asian countries gradually lifted restrictions on
foreign investors, China's stock exchanges "furiously" worked to
issue B-Shares about one year following the opening of the
Shanghai exchange and much less than one year after the
Shenzhen exchange began trading. 16 1 In addition, the U.S. stock
market was slow to develop compared to the growth of China's
markets. 6 2 In the United States, stock trading took place in the
streets of Manhattan for a long while, and regulatory oversight by
the SEC began over twenty years after the exchange moved inside
in 1908.163

Behind the implementation of these swift reforms are various
economic theories aimed at resolving China's "counter-socialist
dilemma." Ever since the Communist Party officially endorsed
economic reform in 1984,164 China's Communist leaders have
looked to scholars to resolve this dilemma. 165
Scholarly
responses have shown that resolution of the counter-socialist
dilemma is not as troublesome as it may seem by looking at

159. Kathy Chen, Chinese News Agency Faces A Quandary: Xinhua
Struggles to Reconcile Politics and Profits,WALL ST. J., Jan. 19, 1996. at A7.
160. Media Curb, CHINA ECON. REv., Aug. 1, 1996. available in 1996 WL
9692279.
161. Sheryl WuDunn. China's Open-Door Stock Policy, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 24,
1991, at D1.
162. Daniel Henninger, Where Are Shanghai's Bulls and Bears?, WALL ST. J.,
Jan. 18, 1996, atA14.
163. Id.
164. Decision of the Third Plenary Session of the Twelfth Chinese
Communist Party Central Committee on Reform of the Economic Structure
(adopted October 20, 1984), cited in Zheng, supranote 65, at 604 n.388.

165. See Chen, supra note 61, at 60, 64-70 (reviewing the early proposal of
the World Bank and numerous subsequent theories advocated by various Chinese
scholars); Tarbutton supra note 27. at 413 n.12 (noting the influence of Chinese
economists supporting theories of stock Issuance based on Marxist teachings that
stock companies represent a form of capital ownership by the organized working
class).
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models of pure capitalism and socialism. One commentator has
observed that "[the sharp distinction sometimes drawn between
'planned' economies and 'market' economies is. of course,

false." 16 6

The continuous existence of non-state sectors of the-

Chinese economy 167 and the heavily regulated sectors of the U.S.
economy bear this out. Other scholars have distinguished "state
ownership" from "social ownership" in terms of an evolutionary
process from direct state ownership to contractual state
ownership to indirect state ownership (social ownership) to
matured social ownership. 168
Under this theory, China's
economy is on its way to "social ownership" under which a
combination of the state, enterprises, and individuals owns
property.
According to one source, Chinese officials have undergone
three "rounds"16 9 of debates since 1984 concerning the
theoretical resolution of the counter-socialist dilemma. During
the most recent debates (from 1989 to 1992), three viewpoints
emerged-the conservative, 170 the pragmatic, 17 1 and the policyoriented. 172 The conclusion drawn from these debates is that
while Chinese officials might "disagree about how far and how

166.
Clarke. supra note 14, at 2 n.2.
167. See id. at 5 ("Contrary to popular belief, the Chinese economy has
never been completely planned from the center, and even in the past reform was
substantially less planned than other centrally planned economies.").
168. See Chen, supranote 61, at 78-83.
169. These debates occurred in the following periods:
1984-85. 1987-89
and 1989-92. See Qian. supra note 5, at 72-85.
170.
"The conservative group stressed the politically sensitive issue of the
nature of a shareholding system and stocks ....
They attacked the proposal of
individualizing state assets and converting them eventually to a system of private
ownership." Id. at 80-81.

171.

Pragmatists "stressed the benefits of, and the urgent need for,

establishing a shareholding system and stock markets without getting bogged
down in an endless debate over the ideological aspects of the shareholding
system." Id. at 81. Professor Li Yining, an established economist at Beijing
University, studied the short and long-term effects of securities markets in China
and concluded that "[flor the long term, securities markets would promote a free,
rational, and optimal flow of resources to the most efficient industries, regions,
and enterprises, thus achieving the greater nationwide economic efficiency being
pursued." Id. at 82-83. See LEES & LIAW, supra note 8, at 63 ("Professor Li
envisages development of China's equity markets as a means of facilitating a
process of corporatization and, eventually, privatization.").
172.
"As a group, [the policy-oriented leaders] emphasized the practical
benefits of establishing a new securities system. They did not regard a new
securities system as a complete transformation, and they believed it could be
implemented step-by-step under central leadership." Qian, supra note 5, at 83.
Jing Shuping, a quasi-government official and one of the first to suggest that
China try a shareholding system, and Liu Hongru, Vice Minister of the State
Commission for Restructuring the Economic System, held this viewpoint. Id. at
83.

606

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OFTRANSNATIONAL LAW

/VoL 30:579

fast China should pursue the securities program," all of these
different theoretical circles "have come to realize the tremendous
need for, and potential benefits from, developing a shareholding
system and stock markets." 173 The PRC's consistent commitment
to market reforms on some level, despite waves of centralization
and decentralization in the past, shows this to be true.
Based on the leaders' common respect for developing a stock
market, it seems apparent that, under one theory or another,
economic reform will continue to transform China's socialist
market economy. Those in power are reformists (albeit to differing
degrees) equipped with a myriad of theoretical arguments and
thus are positioned to effectuate change away from the traditional
ways of socialism.
As one commentator recently noted,
"[Economic restructuring is no longer an ideological question. It
is more of a technical one." 17 4 Nevertheless, resolving the
counter-socialist dilemma will continue to be a challenge for
China's leaders.
The influence of politics on the economy cannot be
understated. History reveals that several Chinese stock markets
have failed in the past due to changing political tides. Therefore,
it is paramount that China continue to move ahead with
economic reforms-in particular, creating a comprehensive
national securities law, increasing the efficiency and accessibility
of the stock market, and repealing the censorship policy-so that
the stock market will be stable enough to withstand the changing
political forces.

IV.

REALIZING THE RE-EMERGENCE:

NATIONAL LEGISLATION AND THE

FREEDOM OF SPEECH

Assuming that Deng Xiaoping's successors will proceed with
the market reforms he set in motion, their efforts (or lack thereof)
will dictate when, if at all, China will realize the true reemergence of its stock market. This section provides several
recommendations designed to improve the stability and efficiency
of China's stock market and its socialist market economy.
A. The Enactment of a NationalSecuritiesLaw
China's government is cognizant of the country's need for a
comprehensive national securities law and has been in the

173.
174.

Id. at 96.
WuDunn, supranote 127.
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process of drafting such a law for years. 175 Effective securities
laws would reduce market risk, boost investor confidence, and
mitigate transaction costs for Chinese issuers. At the present
time, stock market participants must follow a plethora of national

and regional regulations.

76

Investors have no guarantee that the

present regulations will remain in force or will be effectively
enforced should problems arise. In addition, the prevalence of
insider trading, limited legal recourse, and restricted tradability of
shares must be addressed by national securities laws in order to
foster the future growth and development of China's stock
exchanges into an internationally recognized stock market.
1. Insider Trading
Along with the economic benefits of any equity market come
many risks and costs, including market cycles, loss of control
over the financial system. and the potential occurrence of fraud
and insider trading. 1 77 Hard data is not presently available to
measure the prevalence of insider trading in China because
insider trading has not been prosecuted to any significant degree
under China's current laws. However, news reports reveal that
insider trading is not uncommon.1 78 The cultural weight placed

on personal relationships guani]1 7 9 in China encourages insider

175. SeeWong. supranote 2. at 1223 n.13.
176.
See Law: B-Share Rules. supra note 91: Liufang, supra note 45;
Spencer, supranote 43;. B Share Issue to Go National. supra note 155: Company
Law, supranote 33. at arts. 129-158 (regulating the issue and transfer of shares
of joint-stock companies). For a description of national and regional securities

laws through December of 1994. see ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CHINESE LAW, supranote 69.
177.

See XI. supranote 4. at xii-xiii.

178.

See Foo Choy Peng Assesses the First Year's Work of the Stock

Exchange's GeneralManager.S. CHINA MORNING POST, Sept. 15, 1996, available in
1996 WL 3768043 (stating that "insider trading is not uncommon in the absence
of a national securities law"); What's News: Business and Finance,ASIAN WALL ST.
J., Jan. 21, 1997. at 1, availablein 1997 WL-WSJA 3795256 (announcing that the
CSRC had fined and publicly remanded two publicly traded companies for insider

trading).
179. Guanxt is a Chinese word meaning "connections."
has noted:

One commentator

Given the rigid division of Chinese society (into families, villages,
professions, schoolmates, workplace), divisions that are difficult or
impossible to cross because it is virtually taboo to make contact with
someone with whom you do not have a recognized and sanctioned
relationship, guanxi, or connections, are the oil of life. The Chinese spend
a great deal of their time, energy, and income on nurturing their
connections and trying to develop new ones.
BoYE LAFAYm'rE DE MENTE, CHINESE EIQUETTE & ETHICS IN BUSINESS 218 (2d ed.

1994).
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trading between those persons having connections within
government agencies or issuing joint-stock companies.
For
instance, in August of 1992, citizens rioted in the streets of
Shenzhen because there were not enough stock applications
impropriety,180

available due to official

Under U.S. law, insider trading is punished severely. 18 1
However, the philosophy behind the strict prohibition against
insider trading--"emphasis on truth-telling and fair play, the
distrust of concentrated economic power, and the unease (while
at the same time fascination) with privilege and status"-Is
difficult to articulate because the harm of insider trading Is
somewhat ambiguous. 182 Many other cultures do not share the
U.S. obsession with punishing the act of lying in the securities
context. 183 However, China has adopted the U.S. stance against

insider trading.
Chinese officials anticipated insider trading and securities
fraud at the advent of the stock market and enacted measures
against such practices.
For instance, the Shanghai and
Shenzhen stock exchanges recognized limited fiduciary duties of
stock brokers and placed various limitations on certain stock
purchasers, such as employees of brokers, personnel of the
exchange, and government employees working for agencies
involved in regulating stock issuers. 184 In late 1992, as a result
of the Shenzhen rioting, quasi-independent securities watchdog
agencies assumed supervisory control of the securities industry,
increasing the autonomy of the securities regulators from direct
government involvement. 18 5 The State Council later promulgated
the 1993 Interim Regulations, which require at least twenty-five
percent of the total stock of the issuing company to be issued to
the public and limit the portion allotted to workers and staff
members of the issuer to ten percent of the amount issued to the
public.' 8 6 These regulations also provide monetary sanctions to
180.
See Holley & Courtney, supra note 74.
181.
See generallySecuritiesExchange Act of 1934 §§ 10(b), 16, 15 U.S.C. §
78 (1994): Donald C. Langevoort. Fraudand InsiderTrading in American Securities
Regulation: Its Scope and Philosophy in a Global Marketplace, 16 HASTINGS INT'L &
COMP. L. REv. 175, 176-77 (1993).
182.
Langevoort, supranote 181, at 182.
183. Id. at 182-83.

184.

Tarbutton, supranote 27, at 419-20.

185.
Llufang, supra note 45, at 173-74; Bodies Set Up to Govern Stock
Market Xinhua News Agency, Oct. 26, 1992, availableIn 1992 WL 11228262.
186.
1993 Interim Regulations, supranote 2, at ch. 2, art. 8(5). In Issues

greater than four billion yuan (480 million U.S. dollars), the Securities Supervision
Committee may consider lowering the proportion of the issue to the public, with a
minimum amount of 10% of the total Issues. Id. See Pitman B. Potter, P.R.C.
State Council Issues National Stock Regulations, E. ASAN EXEC. REP., July 15,
1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, Easlan File.
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be imposed against insider traders.' 8 7 Furthermore, the CSRC
promulgated tentative procedures against securities fraud in
September of 1993,188 released the Regulation Prohibiting
Cheating in 1995,189 and recently launched a new "inspection
regimen" to monitor publicly traded companies' information
disclosure practices. uses of initial public offering proceeds, and
internal corporate governance. t9 0 As shown by such regulatory
efforts, one scholar notes that "the intent clearly is to increase
opportunities for public participation and limit the advantages
enjoyed by promoters and other insiders." 19 1 However, such
measures against insider trading must be incorporated into a
comprehensive national securities law and be vigorously enforced
1 92
before they will have any practical significance.
2. Marginalized Individual Shareholders
Comprehensive national securities laws will reduce the risk
associated with the Chinese stock market and thus encourage
greater investment if they provide adequate protection of the
rights of minority shareholders which is the status of all
individual shareholders. 1 9 3 Despite the enactment of Chinas
Company Law, which grants significant rights to shareholders,
individual shareholders still lack legal recourse to protect their
rights.
China's Company Law grants shareholders an impressive
amount of power, even surpassing that given to shareholders

187. Tarbutton, supra note 27, at 425 & n.115. Under Article .72 of the
1993 Interim Regulations, violators of the insider trading law must disgorge all
profits made through such dealings and may incur a fine of up to 500,000 yuan
(about $62,000 in 1994). Id. Article 81(14) defines an "insider" as a "natural
person having access to insider information due to the individual's holding of the
Issuer's shares, being a director, supervisor, or manager of the issuer or closely
related to such a person, or serving in a regulatory or professional role." Id.
188. See 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CHINESE LAW. supra note 69, at 61 (describing
the main contents of the Prohibition of Securities Fraud Tentative Procedures
promulgated on September 2. 1993).
189. Securities Market Growing Fastin China, Xinhua News Agency, Dec. 21,
1995, availablein 1995 VL 13484130.
190. Regulator Launches New Way to Inspect Listed Chinese Firms, ASIAN
WALL ST.J., Jan. 21, 1997, availablein 1997 WL-WSJA 3795248.
191. Potter, supra note 189.
192. See Art & Gu, supra note 33, at 274 n.6 ("Gaps in the statutory
framework are readily apparent. For example, despite the pervasiveness of
embezzlement, corruption, bribery, and other misconduct, China lacks laws to
combat or deter these abuses.").
193. See Wong, supranote 2, at 1239 ("With only about 25% of all shares
permitted to trade publicly under the current securities regulatory regime, the
government effectively maintains a controlling stake in virtually every publicly
traded state enterprise.").
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19 4
under state corporation laws in the United States.
Shareholders enjoy the right to call special meetings, to elect and
dismiss directors and supervisory committee members, to inspect
financial reports, and to vote on the issuance of additional shares
and fundamental changes in the company. 195 Unlike U.S. law,
Chinese law allows shareholders to take a role in the
management of the company, including approval of its budget
and the distribution of dividends. 196 Shareholders in China may
also sue for an injunction and damages for board action that
infringes upon their legal rights. 19 7 On its face. China's Company
Law appears to protect shareholders quite adequately.
However, in reality, individual shareholders are marginalized
in their ability to oversee management decisions of the company
because the majority shareholder who reaps the benefits of these
generous shareholder rights provisions is the state. 198 Thus,
individual domestic and foreign shareholders, the only investors
whose shares are traded on the stock exchange, must buy stock
with the risk that management may choose to seek unprofitable
19 9
state objectives.

3. Legal Recourse for Shareholders' Grievances
National securities laws must also strengthen a shareholder's
ability to seek legal recourse for grievances. In the past, investors
have suffered limited rights of legal redress based on the
vagueness of the statutory right of action 2 °0 and the ambivalence
202
of the Chinese courts 20 ' regarding enforcement of such a right.
The courts' inability to enforce legal standards stems from several
factors: the judges' lack of education, the prevalence of official
corruption, the ability of Adjudication Committees to override a
judge's opinion, the judge's vulnerability to outside political

194.

Art & Gu, supra note 33, at 296-97.

195.
196.
197.

Id. at 296 (citing corresponding provisions in the Company Law).
Id. at 297.
Id. at 297 (noting that the Company Law does not specify whether the

suit can be direct or derivative in nature).

198. See Matthew D. Latimer, Gilding the Iron Rice Bowl: The Illusion of
ShareholderRights in China, 69 WASH. L. REV. 1097, 1105-07 (1994).
199. Id. at 1107.
200. Article 111 of the Company Law states without specificity that
shareholders have a right of action if a board decision "violates laws and
administrative rules, and invades the legal interests of the shareholders." Art &
Gu, supranote 33, at 297 & n.164. It is unclear as to which laws, administrative

rules, or legal interests of the shareholders may be violated.
201. The Chinese court system is not independent as in the United States.
Rather, the court president and judges are chosen by the National People's
Congress Standing Committee. See Clarke, supranote 14, at 19-22.
202. Latimer, supra note 198, at 1107-11.
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pressures, and the obstacles to enforcing court judgments
against well-connected defendants. 20 3 In addition, China has
historically operated under a disciplinary (rather than a legal or
adjudicative) system which focused on maintaining order rather
than preserving individual rights. 20 4 However, one commentator
notes that while the private actions are futile, the Company Law
imposes a deterrent criminal liability system of "progressive
discipline" ranging from fines to "administrative sanctions" to
20
severe criminal punishment.
Even comprehensive national securities laws might not be
able to improve the protection of shareholder rights given the
flaws of China's court system. An effective alternate forum may
be arbitration. In February of 1995, the China International
Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission appointed a panel
of arbitrators to settle disputes between brokerages, or between
brokerages and stock exchanges. 20 6
However, individual
investors still have only one (ineffective) way to redress their
grievance: Chinese courts. Therefore, a comprehensive national
securities law should take into account their lack of legal
recourse and make alternate dispute forums available to
individual shareholders.
4. Transferability of Shares
Despite the incredible growth in China's securities markets
over the last decade, its stock issuing activities are still very
limited. The small number of listed companies and the restricted
transferability of different classes of shares present barriers to
the development of a truly competitive stock market. Shares are
distinguished by the identity of the shareholder-state shares,
legal person shares, individual shares (A-Shares) and foreign
shares (B-Shares, H-Shares, and N-Shares).20 7
With the

203. Clarke, supra note 14, at 57-69.
204. Latimer, supra note 198, at 1108 ("Under a legal system, the emphasis
Is on justice and securing the rights of the individual. A disciplinary system, on
the other hand, strives to maintain order, to achieve common objectives, and to
quell disputes.").
205. Art & Gu, supra note 33, at 299. In 1994, for example, the president of
a Chinese company who embezzled about $375,000 was executed. Id. at 299-300
n.185.
206.
ChinaAppoints Securities Arbitration Panel, 6 WORLD ARB. & MEDIATON
REP. 76, 76 (1995). availableinWFSTIAW, WAMREP Database.
207. See Liufang, supranote 45, at 202-12 (giving a detailed description of
each class of shares); Wong, supra note 2, at 1238-44 (describing the share
classification system and its effects on corporate finance).
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exception of institutional investing, 2 08 only individual shares and

20 9
foreign shares are transferable on the Chinese stock markets.
While unlisted shares may be traded on the experimental OTC
2 10
markets in such provinces as Hubei, Liaoning, and Shandong,
such OTC trading will not improve the stability of the two stock
exchanges.
The limited transferability of shares has led to a misleading
calculation of the stock price index (which incorrectly treats all
shares of a listed company as transferable), a low trading volume
and turnover rate (which conceals short-term speculation and
skews investors' risk assessments), and an increased danger of
market manipulation or arbitrage (based on the smaller number
of shares needed to manipulate).2 1 1 Furthermore, the share
classification system distorts the fair pricing function of an
efficient stock market because it creates four different prices for
securities of the same entity. 2 12 This results in a host of
corporate finance problems for Chinese companies and their
investors. 2 13 In sum, restricted transferability increases risk for
investors.
To combat these negative effects, the national
securities law should allow for a broadening of the trading of

shares, either through increased individual share issuance or the
trading of the state and legal person shares.
B. Freedom of Speech: Censorship'sEffect on Market Efficiency
China's 1982 Constitution includes a freedom of speech
clause. 2 14
However, China's Constitution has never been
regarded as a description of reality. Instead, it Is a likely
indication of significant change to come. 2 15 Likewise. China's

208. Liufang, supra note 45, at 215.
The Shanghai and Shenzhen
exchanges permitted institutional investing on October 16. 1992, and September
4, 1993 respectively. Id.
209. Id.at 212.
210. See Over-the-Counter Stock Market Booming in Wuhan, Xinhua News
Agency, Jan. 23, 1996. available in 1996 WL 3774674.
211. Liufang, supra note 45, at 214.
212. Wong, supranote 2, at 1240.
213. I& at 1240-44.
214. "Citizens of the People's Republic of China enjoy freedom of speech, of
the press, of assembly, of association, of procession and of demonstration."
XLANFA [constitution] art. 35 (1982), translationavailable in LEXIS. Intlaw Library.
Chinalaw File, No. 141.
215. See William C. Jones, The Constitutionof the People's Republic of China.
63 WASH. U. L.Q. 707 (1988).
The written constitution was not the place to start If one wanted to know
what the government of China was really like ....
This Is not to say that
written constitutions play no role in the Chinese polity. They clearly have
one function: The adoption of a constitution Is a signal that a significant
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inefficient market prices do not truly reflect the value or risk of its
stocks, based on the lack of available information to Chinese
investors. 2 16 In order to increase the efficiency of China's stock
market and move closer to achieving the goals set forth in its
1982 Constitution, China must abandon its exclusive control of
financial information.
On January 16, 1996, the Chinese government announced
its policy to control the distribution of all financial information
entering China from outside news sources. 2 17 Foreign news
organizations believe that the state-controlled Xinhua News
Agency offers inferior economic news compared to its
218
international rivals based on scope, timeliness, and quality.
Therefore, this information gatekeeper policy will inevitably
decrease the efficiency of China's stock market as well as the
accuracy of its pricing. This in turn prevents China from
competing on equal ground with more efficiently informed foreign
markets. 2 19 Based on economic theory rooted in the "efficient
capital market hypothesis,"2 20 an efficient stock market cannot

emerge if it operates by using imperfect or delayed information.
In more poetic terms. "Until China's markets are watered with
accurate and plentiful information, only the poisonous weeds will
flourish."2 2 '
Some commentators speculate that profits motivated the
gatekeeper policy, following the cutback on Xinhua News

change has taken place in the government or in society, and that it is
conceived to be long-lasting ....
[Clonstitutions also tend to show the

direction that their promulgators plan to take in governing China.
Id. at 711-13.
216. This argument assumes the validity of the efficient capital market
hypothesis (ECMH). See LEWIs D. SOLOMON Er AL., CORPORATIONS LAW AND POLICY

899-904 (3d ed. 1994) (discussing the ECMH, which is based on the premise that
security prices fully reflect available information).
217. Kahn. supranote 146.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220.
'The efficient market hypothesis' is the term used to describe the
proposed (hypothesized) relation between security price movements and
information available to investors in the market.... An efficient market is
one in which the interaction of a large number of buyers and sellers
results in prices that fully reflect publicly available information about the
goods traded and that react virtually instantaneously to reflect new
information as it becomes available.
FASB, The Efficient Market Hypothesis: Tentative Conclusions of Objectives of
FinancialStatements of Business Enterprises, 39 122-30 (1976), quoted in Cox ET
AL., SECURmES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 34 (1991).
221. Editorial, Review & Outlook China's Closed Door, WALL ST. J., Jan. 18,
1996, at A14.
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Agency's state subsidization, because Xinhua now charges fees to
foreign news services. 2 2 2
Other journalists believe that the
Chinese government seeks to avoid the detrimental market effects
caused by rumors, such as the 1995 rumor regarding the death
of Deng Xiaoping, which caused a sharp downturn In the
markets. 2 23 Another equally plausible explanation is that the
state fears losing control over the securities markets. Whatever
the motivation behind China's censorship policy, this policy
detrimentally affects the development of an efficient and
internationally competitive stock market and should be repealed.

V.

CONCLUSION

China has a long way to go before its fledgling stock markets
develop into independent and internationally recognized
exchanges.
However, based on the swift rate of ideological,
political, and economic changes since the advent of China's open
door policy in 1979, China is wel positioned to truly realize the

re-emergence of its stock market in the early part of the tventyfirst century. Patience is perhaps the best word of advice for proreformists frustrated by recent signs of conservatism. In the
words of Confucius:
Do not be In too much of a hurry to get things done. Do not see
only petty gains. If a man hurries too much, things will not be
done well or thoroughly. If he sees only minor advantages, nothing
224
great is accomplished.

China has already shown great accomplishments in building
stock markets in Shenzhen and Shanghai. The development of a
world class stock market is within China's reach if its leaders
continue to make steady gains in improving the efficiency and
stability of its stock market.
Ann P. Vandevelde
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